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ABSTRACT  
 
Extensive research identified the economic, organizational and social factors that configure 
the process of cross-business unit (“cross-BU”) collaboration leading to the creation of cross-
BU synergies. Yet, the inner workings of the “black box” determined by the multiple cause 
and effect relationships between these factors remains to be determined. Building from 
current theory, we studied the process of cross-BU collaboration through a simulation model. 
We found that the initial conditions and patterns of evolution of the different configurations of 
factors lead to significant differences in the performance of cross-BU collaboration initiatives.  
Our findings extend previous research, characterizing cross-BU synergy creation as a 
multidimensional and complex phenomenon, by identifying the drivers of such complexity 
and its effects on performance. We also shed light on the impact of business relatedness on 
performance and on the roles of the corporate level in multi-business firms. We finally discuss 
how managers should manage cross-BU initiatives under different organizational 
arrangements.  
 
Keywords: 
Cross-business unit collaboration, corporate strategy, synergy, system dynamics  
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Introduction 
The concept of synergy has occupied a preferential place in the strategic management 
literature since its introduction by Ansoff (1965). Synergy is the effect that the combined 
return of a whole is greater than the sum of the returns of the individual parts. In the specific 
context of multi-business firms, cross-business unit (cross-BU) synergies have been 
associated to leveraging resources across related businesses (Markides and Williamson 1994; 
Palich, Cardinal and Miller 2000; Martin 2002; Collis and Montgomery 2008; Schmidt and 
Kiel 2010) as well as to market power (Hill 1994) and to the relative efficiency associated to 
the administrative coordination of certain activities (Williamson 1975; Hill 1988; Khanna and 
Palepu 1997). Yet, exploiting the economic benefits associated to leveraging resources across 
businesses is far from being a straightforward phenomenon. It demands putting in place 
specific organizational arrangements and mastering specific management capabilities 
(Mintzberg 1979; Hill and Hoskisson 1987; Hoskisson 1987; Chandler 1991; Bowman and 
Helfat 2001; Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001; Goold and Campbell 2002; O’Reilly and Tushman 
2007; Krestchmer and Puranam 2008) as well as the existence of social relationships among 
BUs managers (Axelrod 1984; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; Hansen 
1999; Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001; Chackravarty et al. 2001; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007; 
Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). While the taxonomy of the economic, organizational and social 
factors associated to the creation of cross-BU synergies is quite exhaustive and well 
understood, some issues need yet to be addressed. For example, how the factors interact 
within the “black box” of cross-BU collaboration contributing towards the success or failure 
of cross BU-synergy creation initiatives. Abundant empirical work reporting the frequent non-
realization of value associated to cross-BU synergy initiatives (Christensen and Montgomery 
1981; Grant and Jammine 1988; Davis and Thomas 1993; Stimpert and Duhaime 1997; Palich 
et al. 2000; Bowman and Helfat 2001; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007) appears to call for 
11203 
 
4 
 
novel methodological approaches to the study of the multidimensional phenomenon of cross-
BU collaboration. Unpacking the “black box” of cross-BU synergy creation calls for a 
research method that enables to capture, observe and analyze the interaction of the different 
factors characterizing the phenomenon of cross-BU collaboration in a formal way. In doing 
so, in this paper we present a formal, longitudinal and comprehensive model of the 
phenomenon of cross-BU collaboration in multi-business firms that captures the 
interdependencies between the economic, organizational and social factors associated to the 
phenomenon identified in previous research. We simulate a formal model considering 
different configurations of such factors and contrasted the different performance associated to 
each configuration, as well as the relative impact of the different factors across different 
configurations and over time. Results document the existence of non-linear relationships 
between the collective impact of the factors that drive cross-BU synergies and the 
performance of cross-BU collaboration. Moreover, the impact of specific individual factors on 
performance varies not only across different configurations of factors, but also over time 
within the same configuration. These findings contribute to the debate on cross-BU 
collaboration by adding new insights on the impact of business relatedness on the 
performance of these initiatives and shedding new light on the role of the corporate level on 
the process. We also contribute to practice by providing criteria on how managers should 
approach the phenomenon of cross-BU collaboration given the particular configuration of 
factors characterizing their firms.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. First, we review extant 
literature on synergy creation through cross-business unit collaboration within multi-business 
firms. Second, we introduce a model of cross-BU collaboration that captures the 
interdependent relationships between a set of factors that have been associated by the 
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literature to the development of cross-BU synergy. We then analyze the model producing a set 
of computer simulations. Finally we discuss the insights derived from the model and their 
implications for the academic debate on cross-BU collaboration.  
 
Literature Review 
While research on corporate-level strategy of the firm has been one of the most 
prolific areas within the Strategy literature since the mid 1960s, the question of how synergies 
may be obtained out of cross-BU collaboration in multi-business firms is at the heart of the 
corporate strategy debate. Research on cross-BU collaboration has identified different factors 
associated to the pursuit of cross-business synergies, clustered around three categories: 
economic, organizational and social.  
Economic drivers of cross-BU collaboration (“Opportunities”). The ability of a firm 
to achieve synergy through cross-BU collaboration is driven by the existence of opportunities 
to take advantage of economic factors associated to the pooling of some of the firms’ 
activities across two or more BUs (Chakravarthy et al. 2001). Such economic benefits are 
associated to three different generic sources of synergy: operative, market power or 
governance advantages. Operative synergies (Panzar and Willig 1981) are associated to 
leveraging resources across related businesses. Such leverage can lead to two generic sources 
of synergy. First, operative synergies may result from the pursuit of efficiency advantages 
from sharing similar resources across businesses (Porter 1987; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; 
Martin, 2002 Helfat and Eisenhardt 2004; Tanriverdi and Venkrataman 2005). This source of 
operative synergies has been characterized in the literature as economies of scope (Panzar and 
Willig 1981). Second, operational synergies may be developed out of market advantages 
associated to the combination of complementary resources across business-units (Milgrom 
and Roberts 1995; Harrison et al. 2001; Tanriverdi and Venkrataman 2005; Schmidt and Kiel 
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2010). Such synergies have been characterized as demand-side economies of scope (Henten 
and Godoe 2010).  
The increase in market power derived from the coordinated commercial actions of two 
or more BUs is also a source of synergies (Hill 1994; Hughes and Oughton 1993; Martin 
2002). Finally the hierarchical coordination of businesses under a corporation, as opposed to 
organizing these via market transactions (Coase 1937; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; 
Williamson 1975; Freeland 2001) may create synergies in the form of reduced corporate risk 
(Chatterjee and Lubatkin 1990; Lubatkin and Chatterjee 1994; Ross et al. 2004) or the 
establishment of internal capital markets (Williamson 1975; Hill 1988; Lang and Stultz 1994; 
Khanna and Palepu 1997).  
Organizational and social factors that catalyze cross-BU collaboration. Empirical 
evidence on cross-BU collaboration suggests that synergies across BUs are hard to materialize 
(Davis and Thomas 1993; Goold and Campbell 1999; Stimpert and Duhaime 1997; Palich et 
al. 2000; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007)). A body of literature gradually emerged shifting the 
attention from the economic drivers of cross-BU synergy towards the organizational and 
social factors that mediated their successful development.  
Organizational factors (“Collaboration ‘Mechanisms”). A stream of work focused on 
describing organizational arrangements firms may rely on in order to enable and facilitate the 
cross-BU collaboration (Bowman and Helfat 2001; Goold and Campbell 2002; Anand 2005; 
Collins and Smith 2006). Such arrangements include the creation of horizontal coordination 
mechanisms for collaboration such as liaison management positions, (Mintzberg 1979; 
Ashkenas and Francis 2000), cross-business committees coordinating knowledge and activity 
sharing (Mintzberg 1979; Goold and Campbell 2002), a corporate intranet, the cross-
participation of executives in the strategic reviews of peer divisions (Chakravarthy et al. 
2001), the remapping of business charters among divisions (Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001) 
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and the incentive system (Krestchmer and Puranam 2008), including the existence of “ad-
hoc” acknowledgements that reward cooperative units for good citizenship (Galunic and 
Eisenhardt 2001. These factors can either help or hinder the implementation of economically 
sounded cross-BU initiatives and incorporate a dynamic perspective to the realization of the 
value from cross-BU initiatives. 
Social factors (“Predisposition”). In addition to organizational factors, the realization of 
cross-BU synergies requires the existence of goodwill between the actors engaged in the 
process of collaboration (Axelrod 1984; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Galunic and Eisenhardt 
2001; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007; Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). Such goodwill or 
predisposition (Chakravarthy et al. 2001) has been associated to the existence of network ties 
across BUs (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Hansen and Lovas 2004; Casciaro and Lobo 2006) and 
trust or relational quality (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Tsai 2000; Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). 
Such ties and trust resulting from previous experiences of cross-BU collaboration also lead to 
the development of specific learning (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) on how to manage these 
horizontal processes. The corporate level may also affect the social aspect of intra-firm cross 
business collaboration, as the specific corporate style (Goold and Campbell 1994) chosen by 
the firm may create common rules of behavior (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Galunic and 
Eisenhardt 2001) among the BU managers, leading to different degrees of predisposition 
towards cross-business collaboration. In sum, social factors can enable or hinder the process 
of economic value creation from cross-BU collaboration opportunities as these affect the 
predisposition of BUs to engage in such processes. 
 
The multiplicity of economic, organizational and social factors characterizing the 
phenomenon of cross-BU collaboration configures the particular context in which specific 
relationships between BUs are embedded. In order to understand the inner working of such 
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configurations and how these evolve as the relationship between BUs evolves through time, 
we need to capture systematically the multiple cause and effect links between factors as well 
as their dynamics through time. We develop such model in the following section. 
 
Representing the causal structure of the theory 
In order to represent cross-BU collaboration systemically and dynamically we 
developed a System Dynamics model (Forrester 1968; Sterman 2000). The model captures 
the interdependencies between the economic, organizational and social factors identified in 
the literature as associated to the creation of cross-BU synergy. System Dynamics enables to 
represent the feedback processes responsible for organizational processes and provides a 
simulation method able to represent organizational change processes (Davis et al. 2007). A 
System Dynamics model allows to identifying state variables which represent properties of 
the organization resulting from organizational processes over time and their rates of change, 
which reflect the effect of organizational processes (Sastry 1997; Repenning 2002; Bradley 
Morrison et al. 2009). System Dynamics models have been applied recently in the field of 
strategic management (Gary 2005; Sterman et al. 2007; Bradley Morrison et al. 2009; Kunc 
and Morecroft 2007; 2010).  
We run a set of simulation experiments based on different configuration of the factors 
affecting the phenomenon of cross-BU collaboration in order to analyze the dynamics 
embedded in the phenomenon. Simulation experiments are particularly effective for research 
questions involving fundamental organizational tensions or trade-offs (Davis et al. 2007). 
Such tensions often result in nonlinear relationships that are difficult to discover through 
inductive cases and difficult to explore using traditional statistical techniques. Furthermore, 
the use of simulation enables the development of logically precise and comprehensive theory 
especially when the theoretical focus is longitudinal, nonlinear or processual.   
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Formalizing the interaction between economic, organizational and social factors 
In order to develop our dynamic model, we first identified the constructs and 
relationships that describe the organizational dynamic related to the process of cross-business 
collaboration.  This task has been performed by conducting a textual analysis of the literature 
on synergy creation through cross-BU collaboration in multi-business firms, identifying and 
allocating statements into the categories required by the simulation model (Sastry 1997). The 
resulting dynamic theoretical model of cross-BU collaboration arises from statements 
describing causal relationships and from descriptions of organizational processes and their 
expected dynamics existing in the literature. Table 1 describes the constructs of the model, 
how these are measured and how these affect the dynamics of the model.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Next, we explain the formal mechanisms governing the interactions between the economic, 
organizational and social factors explained in Table 1. 
Opportunities for cross-BU collaboration (OCt) is a state variable representing the number of 
opportunities for cross-BU collaboration available between two BUs. These opportunities 
may either be the result of corporate mandates or generated independently by the BUs (Panzar 
and Willig 1981; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Martin 2002; Helfat and Eisenhardt 2004; 
Tanriverdi and Venkrataman 2005). The value of the variable is equal to the initial number of 
opportunities available for cross-business unit collaboration less the number of opportunities 
already explored by the BUs (crt). The process of collaboration (crt) depends on the existing 
opportunities for collaboration (OCt), the predisposition to collaborate (pct) (Tsai and 
Ghoshal 1998; Hansen and Lovas 2004; Casciaro and Lobo 2006; Martin and Eisenhardt 
2010) and the existence of organizational mechanisms to catalyze collaboration between the 
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BUs (mct) (Mintzberg 1979; Ashkenas and Francis 2000) representing the organizational 
factors affecting the realization of synergies. Formally;  
OCt  = OC0 + ∫ - crt     (1) 
crt = OCt *∙pct  * mct      (2) 
 
The execution of collaboration initiatives generates a process of Learning from Collaboration 
(LPt), which increases the level of knowledge of the BUs on how to manage cross-BU 
collaboration. As BUs go through the process of engaging in successive cross-business 
initiatives, they learn gradually how to run such process through better organizational 
mechanisms (Hamel 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). We capture this phenomenon 
through the variable LPt. Such experiential learning on how to run cross-BU collaboration 
processes is reflected in the increased effectiveness of the horizontal mechanisms for 
collaboration supporting these initiatives (Martin and Eisenhardt 2010), as well as in their 
levels of trust and relational quality (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). In 
this way, learning increases the likelihood of achieving success from collaboration (cbut). 
Such process of learning is affected by the ability of the BUs to absorb the lessons from each 
opportunity (α) (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). The ability of the BUs to learn from experience 
(α) ranges from zero (no learning ability) to one (every collaboration initiative generates a 
“lesson” which is fully absorbed by the BUs). In turn, learning was modeled to increase up to 
a maximum level, from which new initiatives do not increase the existing stock of knowledge. 
It is also important to highlight that the variable LPt may have different initial states (LP0), 
reflecting different levels of initial knowledge. The influence of learning on the mechanisms 
of collaboration (mct) is a non-linear function of the accumulated learning (LPt). Formally; 
LPt = LP0 + ∫ crt . α     (3) 
Max LPt  = 100 
11203 
 
11 
 
mct = ƒ(LPt)      (4) 
cbut = ƒ(LPt)      (5) 
 
Predisposition to collaborate (PCt), is a social factor, representing the willingness of the BUs 
to engage in cross-BU collaboration initiatives (Axelrod 1984; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; 
Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007; Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). 
The level of this state variable ranges from zero (no predisposition) to 100 (maximum 
predisposition). The predisposition to collaborate varies according to the outcome of previous 
cross-BU collaboration initiatives (rct). Previous experiences of success or failure impact on 
the willingness of the BUs to engage in further collaboration (Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). 
Moreover, the predisposition to collaborate may decrease if the performances associated to 
previous collaboration initiatives are negative (variable η). In the model, such negative effect 
could be limited (variable η is equal to zero) or amplified (variable η is equal to one). Finally, 
a very low initial level of predisposition to collaborate (PC0) may hamper the realization of 
cross-BU collaboration as BUs do not have the minimum “critical mass” of predisposition 
required to trigger the whole process. Formally;  
PCt  = PCto + ∫ ƒ(rct)     (6) 
where Max PCt  = 100; ƒ(rct)= rct {rct ≥ 0};  
ƒ(rct)= rct* (1+η) {rct < 0}     (7) 
pct = ƒ(PCt)      (8) 
 
The variable Performance of cross BUs collaboration initiatives (rct) captures the value 
created or destroyed out of the opportunities for collaboration that have already been explored 
by the BUs (ort). Such value depends on the capability of the BUs to improve the results 
obtained from collaboration initiatives (cbut) and the impact of the complexity of the 
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opportunity realized (ß). The impact of the complexity of the opportunities (ß) on the value 
created from a specific collaboration initiative is determined by a normal random distribution 
in which the initial mean and standard deviation reflect an average level of complexity in the 
opportunities for collaboration (see table in appendix for values). The mean will increase and 
the standard deviation will decrease as the capability of the BUs to generate value out of each 
collaboration initiative increases due their better management skills (LPt)  
rct  = crt * [ (ßµ + cbut) +  (ßσ + cbut) ]   (9) 
 
Figure 1 is a system dynamics diagram (Sterman 2000) representing the model and the 
relationships between the variables characterizing it. Stocks represent the state variables that 
accumulate or deplete over time. The stock variables are “Opportunities for cross-BU 
collaboration” (OCt), “Predisposition to collaborate” (PCt) and “Learning from 
collaboration” (LPt). Additionally, the model has four feedback processes (Sterman, 2000) 
driving the long-term dynamics of collaboration initiatives. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
The first feedback process is a balancing process (B1) which represents the dynamics 
affecting the stock of opportunities for cross-BU collaboration (OCt) that the BUs may 
pursue. The initial value of OCt represents the number of activities of the BUs that could 
benefit from cross-BU synergies provided that such activities were managed in a collaborative 
way. For instance, BUs could benefit from pooling their purchases, the joint contracting of 
outsourced IT services or by merging their treasury departments. In the model, as BUs 
gradually explore these opportunities to collaborate, the stock of opportunities available for 
cross-BU collaboration declines and eventually exhausts. The second feedback process (R1) 
is a reinforcing process that comprehends the Predisposition to collaborate (PCt). The 
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performance associated to previous collaboration initiatives impacts on the value of PCt. 
Previous positive results will increase the value of PCt, while negative ones will reduce it. 
(see Figure 1). In turn, the degree of predisposition to collaborate affects directly the 
aggregate number of opportunities for cross-BU collaboration that are actually explored. A 
substantial drop in the value of PCt leads BUs to cease on their cross-BU initiatives, 
regardless of the availability of further opportunities of collaboration. The third feedback 
process (R2) is another reinforcing process and represents the learning process taking place 
within the BUs as they engage in cross-BU collaboration initiatives. Each collaboration 
initiative represents an opportunity to learn how to manage cross-BU initiatives (LPt). The 
capability to manage cross-BU initiatives developed through such learning process enables 
BUs to increase the effectiveness of the organizational mechanisms for cross BU 
collaboration, (e.g. task forces, cross-BU meetings and information flow, choice of staff 
involved in cross BU initiatives, etc.), that reinforce collaboration between BUs leading, in 
turn, to further learning. The final feedback process (R3) involves the impact of such learning 
processes on another outcome: the ability of BUs to obtain a positive performance from the 
cross-BU collaboration processes. As learning accumulates, increasing the BUs’ capability of 
managing cross-BU collaboration initiatives, the performance associated to collaboration 
initiatives is also likely to increase. In turn, these positive outcomes improve the 
predisposition to collaborate among BUs facilitating the development of further collaboration 
processes that improve learning and performance, reinforcing the whole process.  
The final step in the construction of the model is to define the values of its constants, 
the initial values of the state variables and the distributions for the random variable. The table 
of parameter values and initial conditions used in the ‘base case’ simulation experiment are 
summarized in the Appendix. The set of parameters presented for the Base Case simulation 
represent an ideal situation in which the two BUs included in the model have high 
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management capability to run cross-business collaboration processes, they show a high 
predisposition to collaborate and they share a large number of rather simple (i.e., low 
complexity) opportunities for cross-BU collaboration. This Base Case is complemented by 
seven additional simulation experiments, to be discussed below, in order to test how cross-BU 
collaboration performs under diverse configurations of factors. 
 
Cross BU-Collaboration under different Organizational Configurations 
In this section, we report the results from the set of simulation experiments. As 
explained in Table 2, we experimented with eight different configurations, each of these 
characterized by diverse sets of parameters. Our aim was to represent a rich variety of 
situations in terms of the relative attractiveness of the economic opportunities for cross-BU 
collaboration and the degree of suitability of the organizational and social contexts for 
collaboration, and analyze the impact of this variety on performance. 
The different combinations of initial conditions and the multiplicity of interdependent factors 
characterizing the different situations represented in the model provide a clear indication of 
the complexity associated to the phenomenon of cross-BU collaboration.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
Analysis 
Our experiments were initially divided in two groups. In the first group, BUs benefit 
from the existence of a high number of opportunities for cross-BU collaboration 
(Configurations 1-5 and 7). In the second (Configurations 6 and 8), such number is low.  
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Accumulated performance of cross-BU collaboration initiatives realized 
 Figure 2 shows the accumulated performance for Configurations 1 and 2. It is clear 
that BUs with the relevant capabilities and predisposition to collaborate engaged in cross-BU 
collaboration initiatives that are relatively simple to manage are more capable of materializing 
the potential for synergies (Configuration 1). However, BUs with similar capabilities and 
social capital dealing with initiatives characterized by a higher level of complexity will show 
lower performances than in the previous case (Configuration 2). In both configurations, the 
BUs dealt with all the opportunities available. Yet, the impact of complexity led them to 
different performances regardless of having an equal level of capabilities.   
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 Configurations 3 to 8 represent organizational contexts where the impact of 
complexity introduced in Configuration 2 is exacerbated by less favorable values for the other 
organizational factors, such as lower capabilities (Configuration 3), lower capabilities and 
predisposition to collaborate (Configuration 4) and still less favorable contexts where BUs do 
not have neither the capabilities nor the predisposition to collaborate (Configuration 5) or 
enough opportunities to develop (Configuration 6). In the final two simulation experiments, 
BUs are induced to engage in collaboration through corporate mandates, even though they are 
not predisposed and/or lack the capabilities to perform cross-BUs collaboration initiatives 
(Configuration 7 and 8). Results from experiments described in Configurations 3 to 8 show a 
lackluster performance of cross-BUs’ collaboration initiatives, a situation widely reported in 
the literature on cross-business collaboration(Christensen and Montgomery 1981; Grant et al. 
1988; Davis and Thomas 1993; Palich et al. 2000; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007). 
 The differences in performance between the Configurations 3 to 8 are presented in 
figure 3. Interestingly, the poorest performances were achieved when the BUs had incentives 
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to continue developing cross-collaboration synergies regardless of their poor levels of, both, 
capabilities and predisposition to collaborate (Configuration 7). In short, the corporate 
mandates aimed at intensifying cross-BU collaboration, far from strengthening the 
performance of the BUs on their cross-BU initiatives, worsened it by forcing them to engage 
repeatedly on processes for which they were too ill equipped organizationally and socially. 
Under this scenario, the higher the number of opportunities available, the more damaging is 
the impact on performance of corporate mandates, as BUs’ learning through experience is not 
strong enough to counterbalance the highly unfavorable initial conditions. Ceteris paribus, in 
the absence of corporate incentives (Configurations 5 and 7), BUs “choose” to limit the 
number of opportunities they engage in, hence, limiting the negative impact of failed 
collaboration on performance.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 It is worth noting that corporate mandates only damage performance under rather 
adverse organizational and social contexts characterized by the existence of BUs with low 
capabilities for cross-BU management as well as a low predisposition to collaborate. 
Contrarily, as shown in figure 4, when cross-BU collaboration initiatives are straightforward, 
the impact of corporate mandates on performance is positive as the ongoing collaboration 
fostered by such mandate contributes to the development of learning on how to manage the 
cross-BU collaboration process more effectively.   
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
The Dynamics of Cross-Business Collaboration Processes 
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 Figure 5 shows the dynamic behavior of two of the factors impacting the performance 
of cross-BU collaboration processes: predisposition to collaborate (PCt) and learning from 
collaboration (LPt). The predisposition to collaborate is strongly influenced by a history of 
past positive performance and achieves its maximum level under favorable conditions 
(Configuration 1 in Figure 5a). Inversely, negative performances damage the predisposition to 
collaborate, hindering the process of collaboration. Such results could be associated to the 
high complexity characterizing the cross-BU opportunities (Configuration 2) or the lack of 
capabilities to manage effectively complex projects (Configurations 3 to 8 - see Figure 5b). A 
strong enough reduction in the predisposition to collaborate interrupts the process of 
collaboration, capping the negative accumulated performance (Configuration 5). Oppositely, 
the existence of a corporate mandate to persist in the development of cross-BU initiatives, 
inducing BUs to collaborate at any cost, may exacerbate the amount of accumulated losses 
(Configuration 8). 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 The realization of successive collaboration initiatives increases the accumulated 
learning of BUs on how to manage the process (see figure 6a and feedback process R2 in 
Figure 1). Such learning leads to higher capabilities to achieve better performances from 
cross-business collaborations (reinforcing feedback process R3). However, when low levels 
of predisposition to collaborate and learning are combined, the number of collaboration 
initiatives explored is reduced, keeping in turn the levels of learning low.  For example, 
Configuration 3 shows a slight increase in learning due mainly to the existence of a strong 
level in predisposition to collaborate. However, if the predisposition to collaborate is low 
(Configuration 4) or there are not enough opportunities to collaborate (Configuration 6), 
learning barely increases (see Figure 6b). In an extreme situation where the BUs lack both 
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capabilities and predisposition to collaborate, learning develops at a very slow pace even if 
the number of opportunities is high (see Configuration 5 in Figure 6b), as the reinforcing (or 
"virtuous") feedback processes develop too slowly for these to be relevant.  Under these 
circumstances, the use of corporate mandates to promote cross-BU collaboration may 
generate capabilities for cross-BU management within the BUs (compare Configuration 5 
with Configuration 7 in Figure 6b). Configurations 6 and 8 reflect the impact of a reduced 
number of opportunities which curtails the development of the learning process. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
Our formal and systemic approach to the study of cross-BU collaboration enabled to 
expose some important characteristics of the phenomenon only partially acknowledged in 
previous research. We found that once the different economic, organizational and social 
factors characterizing the phenomenon are analyzed systemically and longitudinally, its 
complex dynamics emerge clearly. Such complexity is manifested in the non-linear impact on 
performance resulting of grouping the factors under different configurations. Moreover, as 
BUs engage in successive cross-BU initiatives the interdependences between the factors under 
a particular configuration evolve under different patterns, resulting in an alteration of the 
individual weight of such individual factors on performance. For instance, similarly attractive 
economic opportunities for synergy creation or similarly effective cross-business committees 
created to coordinate the cross-BU relationships will have varying impacts on the 
performance of a certain cross-BU initiative under different configurations of factors and, 
within the same configuration, at different moments in time.  
Our findings highlight that, while generic patterns of evolution can be observed (as 
discussed below) it is critically important to know and understand the context in which cross-
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BU collaboration is being attempted before making any prescription of how to manage such 
process. This exposes the limitations of cross-sectional research designs that intend to isolate 
the relationship between economic factors and the performance of cross BU synergies and 
derive prescription out of its results. Such limitations have been previously exposed by 
qualitative work focused on the organizational and social factors related to cross-BU 
synergies (Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007; Martin and 
Eisenhardt 2010). Yet, our formal design enabled to study the phenomenon systematically 
under controlled conditions, identifying the drivers of the complexity and its effects on 
performance.  
Our findings also contribute to the debate on the roles of the corporate level on cross-
BUs collaboration initiatives. The abundance of studies on the failure of firms to achieve 
synergies successfully (Christensen and Montgomery 1981; Grant and Jammine 1988; Davis 
and Thomas 1993; Goold and Campbell 1999; Stimpert and Duhaime 1997; Palich et al. 
2000; Kleinbaum and Tushman 2007) led recent scholars to explore the organizational and 
social dimensions of cross-BU collaboration initiatives. Some case-based studies suggest that 
BUs are likely to be more successful in the pursuit of cross-business synergies if they run the 
process autonomously in the absence of corporate intervention (Goold and Campbell 1999; 
Chakravarty et al. 2001; Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). Studies intended to isolate the 
business, industry and corporate effects on performance also disagree on the relative 
importance of “corporate effects” (Rumelt 1991, Brush and Bromiley 1997; McGahan and 
Porter 1997, 2002; Chang and Singh 2000; Bowman and Helfat 2001, Ruefli and Wiggins 
2003). Our experiments show, however, that the desirability and impact of corporate influence 
is contingent to the "literacy" of the BUs on how to manage the organizational and social 
aspects associated to the process of cross-business collaboration. BUs with a certain 
experience in managing cross-BU collaboration initiatives are likely to both, have developed 
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the capability to do so effectively as well as showing a higher degree of predisposition to 
engage in further collaboration provided that a history of previous successful collaboration 
exist. Yet, in the absence of such experience and predisposition, only exogenous factors such 
as corporate mandates to engage in collaboration or the appointment of new managers from 
outside the firm with specific expertise or predisposition to engage and persevere in these 
processes (i.e., “buying in” the capability that BUs would otherwise take some time to 
develop) can lead BUs to engage in cross-BU collaboration. Eventually, the virtuous cycles 
resulting from increased knowledge and predisposition would reach a threshold level from 
which BUs would engage voluntarily in cross-BU collaboration without the need of further 
inducements. However, our model shows that if the particular configuration of factors 
characterizing the specific situation is quite adverse for the development of cross-BU 
collaboration (i.e., complex opportunities for collaboration coupled with low predisposition to 
collaborate, and a severe shortage of organizational capabilities) corporate mandates would 
lead to counterproductive outcomes: the more the corporate level induced BUs to persevere 
on trying new cross-BU collaboration initiatives, the worst would be the accumulated 
performance of the effort. In these cases corporate interventions should be focused only on 
strengthening the social and organizational factors by introducing managers embodying those 
skills or by providing advice. Thus, 
 
Proposition 1. Autonomous cross-BU synergy creation can only be successful when the 
collaborating BUs have a minimum threshold of organizational capabilities for cross-BU 
collaboration as well as the predisposition to do so.  
 
Proposition 2a. Corporate mandates to engage in cross-BU collaboration may help BUs 
lacking a minimum threshold of capabilities and/or predisposition to persevere beyond the 
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level they would if left on their own. Eventually, such perseverance would lead to the 
development of the increased capabilities and predisposition.   
 
Proposition 2b. If the shortage of predisposition and management capabilities of the BUs for 
cross-BU collaboration surpasses a critical level, the impact of corporate mandates leading 
to further initiatives damages performance.  
 
Our findings also shed light on the importance of business relatedness on the 
performance of cross-BU collaboration. Relatedness of activities between business units, 
leading to economies of scope, has been widely reported as a factor that increases the success 
of cross-BU collaboration (Rumelt 1974; Bettis 1981; Markides and Williamson 1994; 1996). 
Our results suggest that the ability of BUs with highly related activities to develop cross BU- 
synergies successfully is not exclusively associated to the underlying economic rationale for 
collaboration but also to the reinforcing impact of organizational and social processes 
associated to cross-BU collaboration. BUs with several related activities are likely to find 
more abundant and sources of potential synergies associated to cross-BU collaboration. As the 
BUs pursue these opportunities, the virtuous cycle of increasing predisposition and capability 
is reinforced, increasing the odds of success. In this way, the traditional economic foundation 
of relatedness is complemented by the not less relevant organizational and social ones, 
creating a configuration that is rather prone to success. However in cases in which highly 
relatedness is not accompanied by the right organizational and social environment, i.e., the 
case of two BUs recently twined by an acquisition that barely know each other, the mere 
abundance of opportunities for collaboration will be less likely to lead to positive outcomes.  
The opposite applies to BUs with few related activities. The relatively low number of 
opportunities for cross-BU collaboration available among non-related BUs, the likelihood that 
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these will be less simple to accomplish and the normal absence of corporate incentives for 
cross-BU collaboration among BUs deemed to offer little synergy potential (Porter 1987; 
Goold and Campbell 1994) are not conducive to the development of a virtuous cycle of 
increasing organizational capabilities and social predisposition. All in all, this leads to a 
configuration of factors hardly conducive to the development of synergies. As mentioned 
above, in cases in which the capability and the predisposition are sufficiently low, our 
experiments show that, even in the presence of corporate mandates, successful collaboration 
is hard to develop. Such factor could be mitigated, as mentioned in Proposition 2b above, by 
an exogenous “boost” of the variables that form the virtuous cycle of cross-BU collaboration.  
 
Proposition 3. Successful cross-business collaboration among BUs with highly related 
activities does not result uniquely from the economic relatedness of the activities, but are also 
the outcome of the organizational and social capabilities for cross-BU collaboration likely to 
flourish among BUs that previous successful collaboration initiatives had helped to develop. 
 
Proposition 3b. BUs with few related activities are less likely to develop successful cross-BU 
collaboration initiatives autonomously, as capabilities and the predisposition to collaborate 
are less likely to be developed through experience.  
 
While our model captures the dynamic relationships between several variables which 
have been reported in the literature as relevant for the phenomenon of cross-BU collaboration, 
it is not free from limitations. First, our experiments are limited to two BUs. Second, the 
factors related to cross-BU synergy creation are assumed to evolve symmetrically in each of 
the BUs, conducing to symmetric performances. Third, we did not model the cost of corporate 
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intervention but just limited ourselves to assess the impact of these on the behavior of the BUs 
and its subsequent impact on the performance of the cross-BU collaboration initiatives. 
 
Our findings also have implications for the practice of cross-BU collaboration. Our 
model reveals the importance of organizational as well as social momentum on the success 
prospects of cross-BU initiatives.  Being those factors strongly linked to experience, the 
tactical advice for successful cross-BU collaboration is to start with straightforward initiatives 
in order to build the virtuous cycle that, eventually, may enable the BUs to approach more 
challenging initiatives with better prospects of success. Starting with high profile, yet riskier, 
initiatives would lead to a volatile scenario of notable success or failure at the beginning of 
the relationship. The latter situation could cripple the predisposition to collaborate further 
even in simpler projects, therefore damaging the future prospects of the cross-BU relationship 
even in presence of abundant and rather straightforward opportunities for collaboration.  
In addition, we mentioned that any prescriptive approach on how to approach cross-
BU collaboration needed to be contingent in nature. On Table 3 we explain which should be 
the rationale and the associated actions related to different configurations of factors. In our 
framework, configurations vary in terms of the level of predisposition to collaborate, the 
abundance of economic opportunities for cross-BU collaboration and the degree of 
organizational capabilities of BUs to manage this kind of process. Our prescribed actions take 
into account the complexity of the initiatives and suggest roles for the corporate level of the 
firm. It must be noted that our framework includes advice for situations of collaboration 
leading to asymmetric payoffs. As mentioned above when discussing the limitations of this 
work, we did not address the possibility of asymmetric payoffs in our model. Yet, we found 
important to contemplate such scenario in our practical framework.   
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Conclusion 
Empirical evidence reporting the difficulties faced by firms at the time of managing 
the successful development of cross-BU synergies led as to develop a dynamic formal model 
comprehending a set of economic, organizational and social factors characterizing those 
processes. Our simulations of different configurations of factors showed that a systemic and 
longitudinal approach can capture the varying impact of each of the factors on performance 
across different configurations and within the same configuration across different moments of 
the relationships between the BUs. Such differences resulted from the initial conditions faced 
by the different BUs and from their varying ability to develop capabilities and social skills as 
the relationship among them unfolded. These results enabled us to revisit and extend our 
understanding of how of business relatedness and corporate intervention may affect the 
performance of cross-BU initiatives. Our analysis led to the development of a set of 
theoretical propositions that summarize the contribution of this paper where a contingency 
perspective on how to approach cross-BU collaboration in practice is suggested.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Set of parameters for the simulation model 
 
Parameter 
Initial 
values 
Description  
 
OC0 
 
High: 50 
Low: 10 
 
Initial number of opportunities for cross-BU collaboration 
ß 
 
 
Low 
complexity 
Mean (µ) 1 
Std Dev (σ) 
0.1 
 
 
 
 
High 
complexity 
Mean 0 
Std Dev 0.5 
 
The value of this variable reflects the impact of the complexity 
embedded in the cross-BU collaboration initiative in the 
outcome (performance) obtained from collaboration. Low 
complexity leads to positive results with low variation. The 
average value is 1 and the standard deviation is 0.1, which 
implies that 95% of the outcome of collaboration will fall 
between 0.8 and 1.2.  
 
 
High complexity implies a mean performance equals to zero and 
increases variability (0.5) so 95% of the outcomes will fall 
between –1 and 1. 
α  1 
 
Represents the ability of the organizations to transform the 
experience obtained from each collaboration initiative into  
organizational learning (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010). It starts 
with a value of 1, which represents a highly capable 
organization able to learn substantially from each collaboration 
initiative. 
 
LP0 50 
 
Initial level of organizational learning is assumed to be 50, 
which represents BUs that, having some experience on these 
process, are not experts in cross-BU collaboration. 
 
PC0 50 
 
Initial level of predisposition to collaborate is assumed to be 50 
indicating that BUs are moderately inclined to collaborate. 
 
η 1 
 
The impact of negative outcomes from previous collaboration 
initiatives in the predisposition to collaborate is augmented 
(Ariño and de la Torre, 1998). 
 
Corporate mandate 0 
 
This variable represents the corporate mandate (Puranam and 
Krestchmer, 2008) aimed at promoting collaboration among 
BUs. In the initial run, we assume that there are not mandates. 
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mct ƒ(LPt) 
 
ƒ(LPt) = 1 {LPt ≥ 80}; ƒ(LPt) = 0.7 {60 < LPt < 80}; 
ƒ(LPt) = 0.6 {50 < LPt ≤ 60};ƒ(LPt) = 0.5 {40 < LPt 
≤ 50}; ƒ(LPt) = 0.1 {LPt ≤ 40} 
 
The nonlinear relationships represent the existence of 
organizational thresholds (Quinn and Cameron, 1983) that affect 
the impact of the state variables on the process of cross-business 
collaborations. Sensitivity tests have been performed on the 
function (Sterman, 2000). 
 
cbut ƒ(LPt) 
 
ƒ(LPt) = 1 {LPt ≥ 90}; ƒ(LPt) = 0.7 {70 ≤ LPt < 90}; 
ƒ(LPt) = 0.5 {40 ≤ LPt < 70};ƒ(LPt) = 0.1 {10 ≤ LPt 
< 40}; ƒ(LPt) = 0 {0 ≤ LPt < 10} 
 
The nonlinear relationships represent the existence of 
organizational thresholds (Quinn and Cameron, 1983)  that 
affect the impact of the state variables on the process of cross-
business collaborations. Sensitivity tests have been performed 
on the function (Sterman, 2000) 
 
 
pct ƒ(PCt) 
 
ƒ(PCt) = 1 {PCt ≥ 80}; ƒ(PCt) = 0.5 {50 ≤ PCt < 80}; 
ƒ(PCt) = 0.1 {40 ≤ PCt } 
 
The nonlinear relationships represent the existence of 
organizational thresholds (Quinn and Cameron, 1983) that affect 
the impact of the state variables on the process of cross-business 
collaborations. Sensitivity tests have been performed on the 
function (Sterman, 2000) 
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Table 1. Constructs and Elements of the Model 
Construct Key element Description Measures Dynamic Behavior 
Opportunities for 
cross-BU 
collaboration 
already explored 
Number of 
opportunities for 
cross-BU 
collaboration already 
explored  
 
Represents the opportunities for cross-business-
unit collaboration that have already been 
explored by two BUs over a period of time. See 
economic drivers of cross-BU collaboration 
Projects under 
development related to 
cross-business-unit 
collaborations 
As opportunities for cross-business-unit collaboration get 
materialized, the stock of outstanding opportunities falls 
until exhaustion  
Predisposition to 
collaborate   
The predisposition or 
goodwill of BUs to  
collaborate  
Reflects the extent of the predisposition of BUs 
to engage in new cross-business-unit 
collaboration initiatives. See social drivers of 
cross-BU collaboration 
Level of motivation of BU 
management to 
collaborate. 
The predisposition to collaborate is dependent on the 
results from previous cross-business initiatives Successful 
experiences increase the predisposition, while failures 
decrease it. 
Opportunities for 
new cross-BU 
collaboration  
Number of 
opportunities to create 
cross-BU synergies 
It represents the number of opportunities 
available to develop new synergies out of cross-
business-unit collaboration. See economic 
drivers of cross-BU collaboration 
Number of opportunities 
for cross-business-unit 
collaboration available  
The number of opportunities mey be determined either by 
the initiatives induced from the corporate-level or from the 
Bus themselves. This is strongly influenced by the 
corporate style  
Performance of cross 
business-unit 
collaboration 
initiatives 
Performance of the 
initiatives aimed at 
developing cross-
business synergies 
from the point of view 
of the BUs 
This variable reflects the accumulated 
performance of all the cross-business-unit 
initiatives already explored by the BUs. See 
economic drivers of cross-BU collaboration 
Value created or destroyed 
by cross-collaboration 
projects 
It depends on the, level of predisposition of the BUs to 
collaborate, the complexity of the initiative, the knowledge 
of the BU developed through previous experience on 
collaboration and on the existence of incentives 
Learning from 
collaboration 
(organizational 
factor) 
It captures the 
learning processes 
occurring at the BU 
level as a result of 
engaging in cross-
business initiatives. 
This state variable accumulates the learning 
occurring between BUs, i.e. the learning curve 
related to cross-business collaboration. See 
organizational drivers of cross-BU collaboration 
Number of best 
practices/activities 
identified from cross-
business collaborations 
It increases from each cross-collaboration project between 
BUs to an extent contingent to the absorptive capacity of 
the BUs. It influences the collaboration mechanisms 
employed during cross-collaboration projects, as well as 
the capabilities to obtain  value from specific cross-
business-unit collaboration initiatives.  
Capability to 
improve results from 
collaborations 
It represents the 
ability of the BUs to 
extract value from 
initiatives 
This variable reflects the organizational 
capability to manage the level of complexity of 
the cross-collaboration initiatives. See 
organizational drivers of cross-BU collaboration 
Value created from 
different type of 
collaboration initiatives 
It increases as the level of learning from collaboration 
increases. It affects the mean and variability of the 
performance obtained from each collaboration. 
Accumulated 
economic 
performance of 
cross-BU 
collaboration 
initiatives 
It captures the 
accumulated 
profits/losses derived 
from the set of cross-
BU initiatives that 
have already been 
explored 
This variable represents the final economic 
performance of the realization of opportunities 
for synergies over a period of time. See 
economic drivers of cross-BU collaboration 
Accumulated economic 
performance obtained by 
the multi-business firm. 
It simply accumulates positive and negative economic 
performances from collaboration initiatives over time. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of the configurations modeled in the simulation experiments 
 
 
Name of Configuration 
Number of 
opportunities 
available(OCt) 
Complexity of 
opportunities (β) 
Predisposition to 
collaborate 
(PCt) 
Capabilities for 
cross-BU 
collaboration 
(LPt) 
Corporate 
Incentives 
1 Base case High Low High High None 
2 Managing complexity High High High High None 
3 
Managing complexity with low 
capability 
High High High Low None 
4 
Managing complexity with low 
capability and social capital 
High High Low Low None 
5 
Managing complexity with no 
capability nor social capital 
High High None None None 
6 
Configuration 4 with few 
opportunities 
Low High Low Low None 
7 
Configuration 5 with corporate 
mandate 
High High None None Yes 
8 
Configuration 5 with few 
opportunities and corporate 
mandate 
Low High None None Yes 
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Table 3. Managerial actions to boost cross-BU collaboration under different scenarios 
Low High Low High
Low 
LOW RELATEDNESS/NO PROCESS          
Rationale: seize scarce valuable 
opportunities                                    
Actions: Bring in external "ad 
hoc"support to overcome lack of 
organizational and social support 
for cross-BU initiatives.                                               
Corporate interest in initiatives 
needs to be clearly communicated      
Complex-high profile inititiaves 
might benefit from corporate 
leadership altogether
LOW RELATEDNESS/NO 
ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS                                              
Rationale: seize scarce valuable 
opportunities                                    
Actions: Bring in external "ad hoc" help 
(internal or external consultants) to 
develop BUs capabilities                               
Corporate interest need to be clearly 
communicated.                                              
Well predisposed BUs lead, with 
corporate oversight                                             
HIGH RELATEDNESS/NO PROCESS 
Rationale: relatedness justifies 
long term effort to build process 
leading eventually to autonomous 
collaboration                                    
Actions: Bring in external help to 
remedy lack of managerial 
capabilities (eg: internal or 
external consultants, l iaison 
manager)                               
Encourage development of low 
complexity cross-BU initiatives 
("quick wins") in order to let 
predisposition pick-up.        
HIGH RELATEDNESS/NO 
ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS. Rationale: 
support BUs will ingness to 
collaborate with management skil ls 
that they can internalize leading 
eventually to autonomous 
collaboration.                                   
Actions: Bring in external help to 
remedy lack of managerial 
capabilities (eg: internal or external 
consultants, l iaison manager). More 
important in case of complex 
initiatives.            
High
LOW RELATEDNESS/NO GOODWILL                                                   
Rationale: seize scarce valuable 
opportunities taking advantage of 
existing organizational processes. 
Actions: Simple initiatives led by 
Bus under corporate oversight                      
Complex initiatives demand 
corporate involvement to 
overcome poor social l inks among 
units                            
LOW RELATEDNESS/WELL PREPARED BUs                               
Rationale: allow competent local 
management to manage the process, 
with corporate oversight                                      
Actions: Top-down approach with 
strong BU input. Consider letting cross 
BU-collaboration develop 
autonomously, unless great asymmetry 
exists on the balance of mutual 
benefits. Asymmetries would require 
corporate inducements for the highest 
contributing BU
HIGH RELATEDNESS/NO GOODWILL                                     
Rationale: Low predisposition 
under strong long term strategic 
interdependence and cross-BU 
capabilities will  hinder 
development of synergies leading to 
a conglomerate                                        
Actions: Strong top-down mandate 
from corporate center.                      
Change dysfunctional  BU 
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Figure 1. Dynamic model of cross-BU collaboration processes1 
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1 Accumulation processes into the state variables, which are represented as boxes in the figure, are identified using flow rates, e.g. the variable ‘change in learning’. Arrows 
indicate the direction of the causal relationship between two variables (Repenning, 2002). The signs at the arrowhead define the type of relationship: either positive or 
negative. A positive relationship implies that an increase or decrease in the independent variable causes a change in similar direction in the dependent variable (increase or 
decrease respectively) ceteris paribus (Repenning, 2002). A negative relationship indicates that a change in the independent variable (increase or decrease) will generate a 
change in the opposite direction in the dependent variable (decrease or increase respectively) (Repenning. 2002). The loop identifier R1 identifies self-reinforcing feedback 
processes. The loop identifier B1 denotes balancing feedback processes. See Sterman (2000) for additional information on feedback processes. 
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Figure 2. Accumulated performance for cross-business collaborations (Configurations 1 and 2) 
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Figure 3. Accumulated performance for cross-business collaborations (Configurations 3 to 8) 
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Figure 4. Accumulated performance for Simple cross-BU collaboration initiatives  
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Figure 5. Predisposition to Collaborate  
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Figure 6. Learning from Collaborations – Dynamic Behavior 
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